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Arbitrariness, Motivation, and the Linguistic Sign
Tim DOWLING
要旨
言語記号は、記号表現（音声）と記号内容（意味）の二つの面から構成される。現代の研
究において、この記号表現と記号内容の結合の概念は、恣意性あるいは有契性に対極をな
してきている。Theo van Leeuwen など多くの言語論者は、Saussure の原理、つまり言
語記号は固定されており、その対象とは無関係であるという恣意性 (arbitrary) に対して、
言語記号はその対象と合理的関係性があり、使用される際に新たに語義が形成されると指
摘している。本稿では、様々な言語記号の見解を調査した結果、Saussure の理論は、す
べての記号は概念的に恣意性であるが、使用されるなかで常に動機づけられるとも示唆し
ていることを論じる。
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1. Introduction
　The study of the sign, the conjunction of a form (signifier) with a meaning 
(signified), in semiotics has been polarised between conceptualising it as being 
either arbitrary or motivated.  In modern linguistics the notion of the sign being 
arbitrary can be traced back to the notes taken at Saussure’s lectures by students 
and which were posthumously published as Course in General Linguistics (CGL) 
([1916] 1986) in which Saussure gave a conceptual account of the linguistic sign 
as being an arbitrary conjoining of a sound pattern with a meaning (CGL: 65-69). 
This concept is not new and its history can be traced back to philosophers such as 
Plato (Cratylus, 384.d) and Aristotle (On Interpretation, 1. 16a1 – 2. 16b5). 
Contemporary social semiotic thinkers on the other hand, such as Hodge & Kress 
(1988), Kress (1993, 2010), Kress and van Leeuwen (2006), Machin (2007, 2010), 
van Leeuwen (1999, 2005), van Leeuwen and Jewitt (2001), among others, take a 
different approach and explore how people use signs to express ideology and 
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meaning through a variety of mediums such as visual designs, music, television 
and film.  From this perspective the suggestion is that all signs (linguistic and 
others) are motivated.
　In my opinion both conceptions are correct, but in different ways because each 
is considering the sign and the notions of arbitrariness and motivation differently. 
However, both are capturing something fundamental about what a sign can 
possibly be and what it actually is.  Halliday (1978a: 11) in his essay Language 
and social man (part 1) gives a diagram of linguistic studies and their relations to 
other academic disciplines, given below in Figure 1.  From this diagram we can 
see that Saussure’s formulation of the linguistic sign lies within the ‘conceptual’ 
angle (the central triangle’s bottom-right corner) and the social semiotic thinkers’ 
conception of the sign lies in the ‘situational’ perspective (the central triangle’s 
bottom-left corner).  Although Saussure conceptually articulated the linguistic sign 
to be arbitrary he fully recognised motivation in language use: ‘There exists no 
language in which nothing at all is motivated.  Even to conceive of such a 
language is an impossibility by definition’ (CGL: 131).
Figure 1.  Halliday’s Diagram of the Nature of Linguistic Studies and their 
Relationship to other Fields of Scholarship.
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　In this essay I will outline what a sign is and introduce Saussure’s, Peirce’s, and 
Barthes’ concepts.  Then I will introduce what is meant by the terms arbitrary and 
motivated and apply these to the different types of signs and the account given in 
social semiotics.  I will conclude that different sign types are conceptually 
arbitrary and motivated in varying degrees according to differing, but valid 
conceptualisations, but are, according to Saussure and contemporary social 
semiotic thinkers, always motivated in use.
2. What is a sign?
2.1
　Anything can be a sign – marks on cave walls, scratches on stones, writing on 
papyrus, tree, /tri:/, arbor, 木 , شجرة, 　　, colour, shape,  　, 　, 　, :-), 　, (^_^), 
loudness, taste, smell, touch, emotion, temperature, smoke, clouds in the sky, a 
portrait, a pub sign, a brand name, its logo and its image, a red rose, a ticking 
clock, a heartbeat, cash registers, the Eiffel Tower, DNA, a gesture, E = MC2, π, 2, 
II, 二 , ۲, hello, こんにちは , the prism on the cover of Pink Floyd’s Dark Side of 
the Moon album (1973), the fonts used on the cover of the Sex Pistols’ ‘Never 
Mind the Bollocks Here’s the Sex Pistols’ (1977), a leitmotif such as the Tristan 
Chord in Wagner’s Ring Cycle or John Cage’s ‘musical composition’ 4’33’’, 
where there is a score, but no notes and which might be best described as 
‘performance art’ rather than ‘music’.  But nothing is a sign until it is made, used 
and/or interpreted to stand for something for some person.  All signs, therefore, 
are motivated in use.  
2.2
　But the concept of what a sign is has been conceived differently.  Saussure 
(CGL: 67) conceptualised a linguistic sign to be dyadic, a signifier (sound pattern) 
conjoined with a signified (meaning, or concept), as shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2.  Saussure’s Linguistic Sign
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　Saussure’s ‘linguistic sign is not a link between a thing (in the material world) 
and a name,’ but is, in its totality, something purely psychological – a mental 
concept associatively linked to a mental impression of the sound pattern rather 
than the actual physical sound made when speaking (CGL: 66).  The linguistic 
sign for Saussure is therefore purely mental.  In his abstract conception of the 
linguistic sign Saussure prioritises the mentalistic langue over the conversational 
parole (CGL: 9) and that values (meanings) are relations between these mentalistic 
signs (CGL: 113).  However, tellingly from this account, the mental concept of the 
sound pattern does correspond to the actual physical sound for it to be a mental 
impression of it.  How this relationship is possible we are not told explicitly, but 
judging by Saussure’s account of thought (A) and sound patterns (B), given below 
in Figure 3, language arises through the margins of contact between these two 
planes, giving rise to a form and not a substance (CGL: 110-111).  
Figure 3.  Saussure’s Planes of Thought (A) and Sound Patterns (B).
　‘Contact’ suggests a causal relationship, as with the wind upon the surface of 
the sea to create waves.  Although the planes are of different ‘substances’ 
Saussure’s account appears to be one of interaction rather than the parallelism of 
epiphenomenal dualism.  Despite Saussure’s attempt at this point in his lectures to 
give an abstract, mentalistic account, his notion of the linguistic sign does 
nonetheless relate to the socio-temporal common events of everyday life through 
a causal relationship.
　The meaning of the linguistic sign is the counterpart of the sound pattern, i.e., 
the concept (CGL: 112) and this relationship is inseparable just as it is ‘impossible 
to take a pair of scissors and cut one side of paper without at the same time cutting 
the other (CGL: 111).  The arrows in the diagram represent the intimate link 
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between these dyadic elements such that someone cannot be conscious of the 
sound pattern without also being aware of the concept and vice versa once the 
concept and sound pattern have been conjoined and fixed in language by public 
usage (CGL: 67).  As language is inherited from generation to generation there is 
a degree of invariability in the meaning associated with any given sign (CGL: 72). 
However, although the relationship between the concept and sound pattern in a 
linguistic sign is inseparable it can shift through time.  As Saussure notes, 
languages are located socially and chronologically (CGL: 76) and change over 
time which always results in ‘a shift in the relationship between signal and 
signification.’ [original italics] (CGL: 75).  This is possible because the 
relationship between the concept and the sound pattern is fundamentally arbitrary 
allowing their relationship to change, even though they remain conjoined (CGL: 
76).  Thus Saussure’s sign is not as fixed and decontextualized as van Leeuwen 
suggests (1999: 193), but is fully fluid and dynamic within a socio-temporal 
context.
2.3
　Peirce, in contrast, considered signs to be triadic; a sign signifies an object and 
this signification creates a mental interpretant which refers back to the same 
object that the sign signified (1998: 13).  Peirce envisioned ten main trichotomies 
of signs, but the one he said he most often used was the fourth trichotomy – Icon, 
Index, and Symbol (1998: 489) and which is the one most discussed in semiotic 
literature.  Icons are ‘likenesses’ in that they resemble what they depict, for 
example a photograph or a diagram that illustrates the important features (1998: 
13).  An Index is a sign that is related to its object, ‘by virtue of a real connection 
with it, or because it forces the mind to attend to that object’ (1998: 14).  Here 
Peirce gives examples of a barometer, a weathercock, the pole star, a pointed 
finger and pronouns.  Symbols are signs, ‘which have become associated with 
their meanings by usage’ (1998: 5) and gives words and phrases as examples.
　Even though Peirce used these three discrete categories he realised that 
individual signs can each be co-interpreted according to the three categories and 
gives an example of maps which can be both an Icon in terms of the resemblance 
of the drawn shapes with the actual coastlines and also an Index in that it indicates 
something particular (1998: 8).  It could also be said that the colours to represent 
altitude and the legend are Symbolic in that they are agreed upon by common 
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usage.  Signs can therefore be simple or complex.
　It should be noted that although Peirce categorised language as a Symbol, 
Saussure felt that this word was inappropriate because for him the linguistic sign 
is arbitrary and that a symbol, such as the scales that represent justice, is already 
pre-loaded with meaning and cannot therefore be arbitrary (CGL: 68).  However, 
despite the conflict of terminology both Saussure and Peirce would concur that 
language is something that has come about by common agreement in usage and 
we only need to look at pidgin and creole languages to confirm such an 
evolutionary development.
2.4
　Signs, however, do not just denote, as Saussure’s and Peirce’s do, they can also 
connote.  Denotation is a first-order of meaning and connotation is a second-order 
of meaning.   Barthes depicts this layering in Myth Today (2009: 138), Figure 4. 
For example, (Kress, 2001: 174 and 178) the word ‘green’ (1. Signifier) denotes 
the colour (2. Signified) and forms the Sign (3) at the first-order of meaning, but at 
a second level the original Sign (3) becomes the second-order I SIGNIFIER to 
connote ‘unripeness/immaturity’ II SIGNIFIED to produce III SIGN.
1. Signifier 2. Signified
3. Sign
I  SIGNIFIER II  SIGNIFIED
III  SIGN
Figure 4.  Barthes’ Conceptualisation of Denotation and Connotation.
　Thus signs can conceptually be conceived in a multiplicity of ways (dyadic or 
triadic; iconic, indexical, or symbolic; denotative or connotative; and simple or 
complex).  But are all these signs arbitrary or are they instead motivated, as social 
semiotics suggests all signs are, and to what degree?  In the next section I will turn 
to discussing what arbitrariness and motivation mean and how applicable they are 
to the different sign types.
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3. Arbitrariness and Motivation
3.1
　One dimension of categorising signs is according to the notions of arbitrariness 
and motivation.  An arbitrary sign is one where the relationship of a signifier with 
a signified has, ‘no natural connexion in reality’ (CGL: 69).  In accordance with its 
etymology, an arbitrary sign is one where any signifier could be chosen to stand 
for any signified.  That is to say, there are no logical, necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any signifier to signify any given signified.  For example, different 
languages have different words to refer to common items – a book in English is 
pronounced /bʊk/ and written ‘Book’ or ‘book’ but is pronounced /hɒn/ and 
written 本 in Japanese.  Different cultures, through their histories, have selected 
different phonemes and graphemes, and each could have chosen differently, to 
signify a common object which bears no natural or logical relationship to these 
signifiers – a book does not look like the grapheme 本 nor sound /hɒn/ when 
touched (CGL: 67-68).  It is as if by accident and common agreement in various 
cultures that a particular Symbol designates a given Object.  Why is it that the 
phoneme /æ/ can be written using a (lower-case) or A (upper-case) in English or 
as あ (hiragana) or ア (katakana) in Japanese?  Why is it that the graphemes a or 
A can also represent the phonemes /eɪ/ and /ə/ in data /'deɪtə/ (CGL: 117-118)? 
Symbols are conceptually the most arbitrary of the signs and this is why Saussure 
considered the linguistic sign to be arbitrary (CGL: 67).  As Halliday notes:
When we talk about the arbitrariness of the sign, we are referring to the 
Saussurean content/expression relation.  I believe every linguist must agree 
that there is arbitrariness at this point.  But there is I think just this one 
point in the whole linguistic system where we can talk about 
arbitrariness…
(1978b: 44)
3.2
　A motivated sign, on the other hand, is one where there is a reason to connect a 
signifier to a signified.  A sign can be motivated in a number of different ways: 
through causation, resemblance, indexation, and intention.  For example, a video 
recording (signifier) of a concert (signified) is highly motivated as it represents 
(resembles and indexes) to a high degree of fidelity what was presented.  As 
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Chandler (2007: 254) notes, ‘The more a signifier is constrained by the signified, 
the more ‘motivated’ the sign is…’  There is thus a continuum along which signs 
can be aligned to be more or less arbitrary/motivated. 
3.3
　Applying the concepts of arbitrariness and motivation through a cline to 
Peirce’s and Saussure’s concepts of the denotative sign we can see the following 
relationships.  An Index is highly motivated in that there is a strong cause/effect 
relationship with the Sign and Object when the weathercock changes direction 
indicating the wind’s movement and indexation with a pointing finger.  An Icon is 
partially arbitrary/motivated depending on the degree of resemblance of the Sign 
with the Object.  A Symbol, being a sign that has no natural, logical, or intrinsic 
relation to what it stands for, or where this relation has been long lost in history 
(van Leeuwen: 2005: 49), thus is, or appears, totally arbitrary.  
　Barthes (2009: 150) thinks that connotation is motivated.  In usage this is 
correct, as all language is, but conceptually connotation is second-order 
arbitrariness.  First there is the arbitrary sound pattern /rəʊz/ denoting the plant 
and then there is the arbitrary plant connoting love and romance.  Why was a red 
rose chosen to connote romantic love rather than a white one or a tulip or daffodil 
or something completely different?  There is nothing intrinsic about a red rose to 
connect it with romance.  The connotation is an arbitrary convention.
3.4
　Despite Peirce’s Symbol and Saussure’s linguistic sign being arbitrary, Saussure 
recognised relative motivation in the case of onomatopoeic words and 
exclamations (CGL: 69), but as different cultures have different sound patterns to 
represent these the linguistic sign remains fundamentally arbitrary.  For example 
the onomatopoeic word for a dog’s bark is ‘woof’ or ‘bow-wow’ in English, but 
‘wanwan’ in Japanese.  Further, Saussure recognized that compound words are 
less unmotivated than the basic parts of which they are composed.  For example, 
wrist and watch taken individually appear highly unmotivated, but wristwatch, 
being a compound of these two words, is less unmotivated.  It is less unmotivated 
in that although a completely different word/sound pattern could have been used 
to refer to the timepiece we wear on our wrists, a compound of the names of the 
place on the body where the item is worn and the object itself were chosen instead. 
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This applies to not just compound nouns but also to other ways in which words 
can be created with pre-existing units such as prefixes and suffixes (CGL: 130) in, 
for example, un+success+ful+ly.
Saussure thinks that relative arbitrariness/motivation is important:
…the entire linguistic system is founded upon the irrational principle that 
the sign is arbitrary.  Applied without restriction, this principle would lead 
to utter chaos.  But the mind succeeds in introducing a principle of order 
and regularity into certain areas of the mass of signs.  That is the role of 
relative motivation. (CGL: 131)
　Thus, if all signs were constantly being used in an arbitrary way, with meanings 
constantly being expressed by different sound patterns then communication could 
not take place.  However, as is plainly the case, linguistic signs, although 
essentially psychological and arbitrary, are ratified by collective agreement within 
communities of language users (CGL: 15).  People do tend to fix relationships 
between concepts and sound patterns (and also written patterns), as any dictionary 
records, and through looking at past definitions we can also see that this 
relationship is only relatively fixed as words and sound patterns change over time 
(diachronic) and are different in various geographies and contexts (synchronic).
　Thus conceptually signs can be considered to fall within a cline of being 
arbitrary/motivated.  Conceptually Saussure rightly articulated the linguistic sign 
to be arbitrary (CGL: 67), but also thought that all language is motivated in use 
(CGL: 131) and to this view I subscribe, and it is at this point where social 
semiotic thinkers make progress in developing an understanding of meaning in 
use.
4. The Motivated Sign
4.1
　Kress criticises the abstractness of Saussure’s linguistic sign, although he does 
accept the arbitrary relation between the sound shape and meaning (Kress, 2010: 
63).  For Kress and other social semioticians the study of the sign is in its use to 
convey meaning focusing, ‘on the material, the specific, the making of signs now, 
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in this environment for this occasion (Kress, 2010: 13) and avoids using Peirce’s 
classification of signs because it allows for degrees of arbitrariness (Kress, 2010: 
65).  For Kress, signs are always newly made in an act of semiosis (Kress, 2010: 
54) in social interaction, and being a motivated conjunction of form and meaning 
based on the interest of the sign-maker using culturally available resources (Kress, 
2010: 10).
The conjunction of a form with a meaning is of choosing an apt signifier to signify 
a signified (Kress, 2010, 55).  Kress (1993: 172) provides a beautiful example of 
his son’s drawing of a car shown below in Figure 5.
Figure 5.  ‘This is a car’
　Kress’ son wanted to depict his idea of a car and did so using the semiotic 
resources he had that he felt best fit the task and chose circles (signifier) to 
represent the tyres and possibly the windscreen (signified) of a car due to their 
resemblance.  The child selected circles (Iconic in their resemblance and Indexical 
in their reference) to signify the wheels.  The word ‘wheel’ (Symbolic in its 
arbitrariness of sound pattern and meaning) would also be an apt signifier in 
English speaking contexts.  Kress (1993: 172) notes, ‘It is important to insist that 
the sign is always motivated from the point of view of the object…’  This is true 
to a certain extent, but also the sign can similarly be motivated from the point of 
view of the subject.  I depict what I want to depict.  I determine the focus and then 
the focus determines what I see.  Interest ‘determines the characteristics that are to 
be selected and to be represented’ (Kress, 1993: 173).  Interest indicates 
motivation.
　The motivated sign can also be transparent or opaque (Kress, 1993: 180).  It is 
always transparent to the person making the sign, but it can be relatively opaque 
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for the listener or reader.  Looking at the drawing, ‘This is a car’, without having 
read the title we would probably have no idea what the circles signified.  The sign 
would be extremely opaque, yet to the sign maker it was obviously transparent 
that they signified the wheels and possible windows of a car.
4.2
　In English we do not use words beginning with the sequential letters p and q 
even though this is conceptually possible.  Thus this semiotic resource is currently 
latent, as are so many others.  Instead, in our spoken and written language we use, 
most of the time, a vast array of pre-existing words, phrases, and other semiotic 
resources, that are ready-made signs (Kress, 1993: 173) and select the most 
appropriate for the given situation.  My selection is my personal choice, my 
motivation, and indicates an individual shaping the course of language change. 
Saussure assumes that language is external to each individual, that it is a social 
phenomenon, and that it is ‘a kind of contract agreed between the members of a 
community’ (CGL: 14).  As such the individual is powerless to create or modify it. 
This is not an incoherent viewpoint.  A lone voice in a crowd is not always heard 
and we are born into a pre-existing language system which we first have to learn 
before we can start to make changes.  Or can the ‘mistakes’ of the language 
learner(s) seep into mainstream usage, such as with the phrase, ‘Long time no 
see’?  But we have to remember that a language community is composed of 
individuals and each plays a part in its evolution.  Although the sound and visual 
patterns of meanings are relatively fixed, that is to say, I cannot use just any word 
to mean what I want it to if I want to make myself understood to others, I can 
introduce novelties that may be taken up by others and which might become 
mainstream usage in the future.   Nonetheless pre-existing signs can be motivated 
in that I have intentionally selected them to convey a specific meaning in a given 
context.   It is as if a person selects a sound and/or visual pattern and imbues it 
with meaning, again, newly for pre-existing semiotic resources, to become a 
signifier to signify a signified for somebody, including themselves.  People have 
made, reuse and make new signs to convey specific meanings in specific contexts. 
Every time a sign is reused or made it has to be reconfirmed or interpreted and 
thus signs are always newly made (Kress, 2010: 62).  The motivated sign is 
dynamic in its social, cultural, and historical context.
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4.3
　It might be said that a limitation of Saussure’s linguistic sign is that it is 
monomodal.  In speech the linguistic sign is only a matching of a sound pattern 
with a meaning - /tri:/ means  　 - and fails to take into account intonation, rising 
for a question and falling for a statement (Kress, 2010: 58) and to this we might 
also add pronunciation (regional accents), fluency (skillful and confident), pitch 
(high being nervous), speed (calm or panicky).  These factors are motivational as 
they tell us something about the meaning of the sign.  They could be causal in the 
case of nervousness, or intentional when changing your accent for a different 
social context.  These factors could all be built into Saussure’s model of the 
linguistic sign by envisioning family sets of related signs where each of the 
different sound patterns related to intonation, pronunciation etc, is in.  For 
example in the set for TREE there would be signs where the sound patterns were 
all variations of /tri:/ amended according to the various motivated factors and 
these sets of signs would be set in further sets, building from letters, to words, to 
sentences.  This appears to be a rather complicated model, but may not be so 
different from the idea of a sign-complex (Kress, 2010: 54).
　In social contexts it is not just the mode of speech that communicates meaning, 
but also the social-semiotic factors accompanying the interchange such as facial 
expression, gaze, posture, proximity, etc.  All of these factors are motivated 
(Kress, 2010: 58).  Kress notes that social semiotic signs are complex, ‘Signs exist 
in all modes, so that all modes need to be considered for their contribution to the 
meaning of a sign-complex’ (2010: 54) and later that, ‘The ensemble of signs as a 
whole makes meaning’ (Kress, 2010: 58).  Therefore, signs used and made for 
conveying meaning in a social context are multimodal and motivated.
5. Conclusion
　To summarise my main points, any sign is the conjunction of a signifier with a 
signified.  Signs can be considered from a conceptual aspect (Saussure’s linguistic 
sign) where it is logically possible for any signifier to signify any signified, or 
from a situational aspect (social semiotics) where a signifier has been selected, 
made material, by an individual to signify a signified in a social, cultural, 
historical, multimodal, environment.  Signs can be dyadic or triadic; indexical, 
iconic, or symbolic; denotive or connotative; and simple or complex.  Are all signs 
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motivated as social semiotics suggests?  In my opinion, conceptually, signs can be 
considered to be located along a cline of being motivated/arbitrary.  With the 
ancient Greek philosophers, Saussure and Halliday I think the linguistic sign is 
conceptually arbitrary, but in use, as Saussure, Halliday and social semiotics 
suggest, all signs are motivated, having been selected from pre-existing semiotic 
resources and newly recreated or created for a contemporary socio-cultural 
situation to be the vehicle that delivers the intended meaning.
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